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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jeffrey Thies was charged with trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts of
felony injury to a
misdemeanor
evidence.

child,

possession

misdemeanor possession
of paraphernalia,

and

of a controlled

substance,

misdemeanor concealment

of

Mr. Thies filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. The district court denied Mr. Thies' suppression motion, finding that the
officers did not unreasonably extend the length of the investigatory detention to
investigate alleged criminal activity. Mr. Ties proceeded to trial and was convicted of
trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts of misdemeanor injury to a child,
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, and
concealment of evidence.

On

appeal,

Mr.

Thies

contends

that

Officer Vogt

unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention, took longer than necessary to
effectuate the seizure, and did so without his consent, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 11, 2010, at approximately 5:44 p.m., Officer Daniel Vogt responded
to a 911 report from dispatch of a "mobile domestic violence situation."
Tr., p.78, Ls.1-14.)

(3/9/11

Prior to the 911 call, Mr. Thies and Patricia Price were driving

toward Mountain View High School to take Ms. Price's two sons to driver's education
training. (3/9/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-20, p.38, Ls.6-16.) While at the intersection of Overland

1

and Meridian, Mr. Thies and Ms. Price got into a verbal disagreement and Ms. Price
threw "'some items at Jeff and a couple of them went out the window and struck" David
Biehl's vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.2.) One of Ms. Price's sons got out of the
vehicle in an attempt to pick up a lighter, one of the items thrown out the window.
(3/9/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-22.)

Mr. Biehl called 911 and followed Mr. Thies' vehicle to

Mountain View High School. (3/9/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-3.) Upon arrival, Mr. Thies dropped
Mr. Price's sons at the curb, parked, and exited the vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.38, L.17 p.40, L.6.)
Shortly thereafter, Officer Vogt arrived and immediately placed Mr. Thies in
handcuffs.

(3/9/11 Tr., p.81, Ls.8-23.)

While Officer Vogt was in the process of

handcuffing Mr. Thies, at least three other officers arrived on the scene.

(3/9/11

Tr., p.81, Ls.19-23, p.82, L.9 - p.84, L.15.) Officer Vogt read Mr. Thies his Miranda 1
rights and began asking him about the situation in the vehicle while Officer Monte Price
questioned Ms. Price. (3/9/11 Tr., p.85, Ls.18-25; Exhibit 3.) Mr. Thies informed Officer
Vogt that he and Ms. Price, his common law wife, had a verbal disagreement, but there
was no physical violence. (3/9/11 Tr., p.86, Ls.1-3.) At about 5:45 of Officer Price's
audio, Ms. Price informed him that she had a verbal disagreement with Mr. Thies, but
that it had not been physical. 2 (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 5:45.)3

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Officer Price's audio recording seemingly starts soon after the dispatch call and
continues recording throughout the incident. At approximately 4 minutes into the audio,
Officer Price arrives on the scene, which is, according to the dispatch, about 2 minutes
after Officer Vogt arrives on the scene. (Exhibit 3.)
3
There are three separate audio recordings on Exhibit 3. Two of the three are from
Officer Vogt's recorder, the final, complete recording was from Officer Price's recorder.
2

2

At approximately 5:52 p.m., Officer Vogt ran a "records check" and learned that
Mr. Thies had a suspended driver's license.
admitted to being the driver of the vehicle.

(3/9/11 Tr., p.89, Ls.17-23.)

Mr. Thies

(3/9/11 Tr., p.89, L.24 - p.90, L.4.)

According to Officer Vogt, Mr. Thies was sweating profusely and seemed concerned
with Sergeant Taylor looking into the windows of his vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.91, Ls.3-23.)
Officer Vogt then repeatedly requested permission to search the vehicle and Mr. Thies
repeatedly refused to consent to a search. (3/9/11 Tr., p.93, Ls.14-18; Exhibit 3, Officer
Vogt Audio 2.) After Mr. Thies refused to allow officers to search his vehicle, Officer
Vogt contacted Officer Lindley for use of his narcotic detection canine and began
working on the citation for driving without privileges. (3/9/11 Tr., p.93, L.19 - p.94, L.5.)
At approximately 14 minutes into Officer Price's audio the narcotics canine is requested.
(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 14:00.) At the time of the request, Officer Lindley was
involved in another traffic stop and was not immediately available. (3/9/11 Tr., p.125,
Ls.1-9.) At approximately 30:30 of Officer Price's audio, it is apparent the canine is on
the scene as Ms. Price as asked to step back because the canine gets nervous.
(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 30:30.) About 45 second later, the canine hits on
Ms. Price's purse. (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 31:15.)
Based upon the canine's initial hit on the outside of the vehicle and subsequent
alert on Ms. Price's purse, officers searched the vehicle, uncovering methamphetamine
in a Crown Royal bag under the driver's seat, marijuana in a purse in the front
passenger seat, a partially smoked marijuana joint in the ash tray, and various alleged
paraphernalia.

(3/9/11 Tr., p.96, Ls.9-20, p.107, L.7 - p.108, L.21.)

Ms. Price were placed under arrest.

3

Mr. Thies and

In November of 2010, Mr. Thies was charged by Amended Information with
trafficking in methamphetamine, two counts felony injury to a child, misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and
misdemeanor concealment of evidence.

(R., pp.36-38.)

Mr. Thies filed a Motion to

Suppress and Amended Motion to Suppress arguing that he was unreasonably
detained during an unconstitutional expansion of an investigatory seizure. (R., pp.4243, 71-82.)

Following a hearing on the motions, the district court denied Mr. Thies'

suppression motions.

(R., pp.125-126.) The district court concluded that the lengthy

detention was not unreasonable because officers were still investigating the alleged
domestic violence incident and the potential malicious injury to property allegation for
the objects that struck Mr. Biehl's vehicle during the mobile dispute. (3/9/11 Tr., p.158,
L.12 - p.162, L.24.) Additionally, the district court concluded that Officer Vogt had not
finished writing the ticket for driving without privileges. (3/9/11 Tr., p.162, L.25 - p.164,
L.16.)
Mr.

Thies

proceeded

methamphetamine,

two

counts

to

trial

and

was

of misdemeanor

convicted
injury to

of
child,

trafficking

in

misdemeanor

possession of a controlled substance, possession of paraphernalia, and concealment of
evidence.

(R., pp.173-178.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen

years, with three years fixed for the trafficking in methamphetamine conviction.
(R., pp.218-220.)

The district court also imposed

90 days for each of the

misdemeanors, to be served concurrently. (R., pp.218-220.) Mr. Thies filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment.
(R., pp.228-230.)

l\/lr. Thies then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which was

denied by the district court. (R., pp.233-239.)
4

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Thies' Motion to Suppress because Officer Vogt
unconstitutionally extended the investigatory detention longer than necessary to
effectuate the seizure, without his consent, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Thies' Motion To Suppress Because Officer
Vogt Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer Than Necessary
To Effectuate The Stop, Without His Consent, In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment Of
The United States Constitution And Article I. § 17 Of The Idaho Constitution

A.

Introduction
Mr. Thies contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because Officer Vogt impermissibly extended the investigatory detention of Mr. Thies
longer than necessary to effectuate the stop.

B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Thies' Motion To Suppress Because
Officer Vogt Unconstitutionally Extended The Investigatory Detention Longer
Than Necessary To Effectuate The Stop, Without His Consent, In Violation Of
The Fourth Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I, § 17 Of
The Idaho Constitution
Mr. Thies contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because Officer Vogt improperly extended the investigatory detention by waiting for the
drug detection canine to arrive on the scene, thereby violating his rights under Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution.

The

Fourth Amendment of the

United

States Constitution and

Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.
Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and thus, violations of the
Fourth Amendment.

State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288 (1995); State v. Mcintee, 124

Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Wight, 117 Idaho 604 (Ct. App. 1990). However,
the State may rebut this presumption by establishing that a warrantless search either
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, or was otherwise
reasonable under the circumstances. Weaver, 127 Idaho at 290; Mcintee, 124 Idaho at

804.

If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant
6

requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded
as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
When reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,
Idaho appellate courts defer to the trial court's factual findings which are not clearly
erroneous; factual findings supported by substantial competent evidence are not clearly
erroneous.

State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007) (citing State v. Klingler, 143

Idaho 494, 495-96 (2006)); State v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009).
However, a trial court's legal conclusions and whether constitutional requirements have
been satisfied based on the facts found are freely reviewed. Id.
Here, Mr. Thies filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the investigatory
detention was unreasonably extended while Officer Vogt waited for a drug detention
canine. (R., pp.71-82.) The district court denied his suppression motion, concluding
that Mr. Thies was not unreasonably detained for an extended period of time in light of
the officers' investigation and that Officer Vogt had not completed Mr. Thies' citation for
driving without privileges. (3/9/11 Tr., p.158, L.12 - p.164, L.16.)
Mr. Thies asserts that Officer Vogt improperly extended the permissible length of
his investigatory detention of Mr. Thies by taking 25 minutes to investigate the alleged
criminal offenses by Mr. Thies and Ms. Price and taking approximately 13 minutes to fill
out a simple citation in anticipation of a requested canine unit, as a result the district
court erred in denying his suppression motion. When the purpose of the detention is to
investigate a traffic offense or other crime, the Fourth Amendment will not be offended,
if the action is based upon a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the vehicle or
occupant has been, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity. State v. Gutierrez,
137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho
7

119, 124 (Ct. App. 1999) (citations omitted). However, the investigative stop must be
temporary, and inquiries made by the officer must be '"reasonably related in scope to
the justification for their initiation."' State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 853 (Ct. App. 2000)
(citations omitted).

Such an investigative stop "must be justified by a reasonable

suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the person
to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho
613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v.
Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 302 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103
(Ct. App. 1992)).
It is the State's burden to demonstrate that the vehicle stop or seizure it seeks to
justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and
duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. State v. Larson, 135 Idaho
99, 101 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 361-62 (Ct. App. 2000)
(citations omitted). Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, evidence that is not
seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, and thus
discovered as a result of an illegal search, cannot be used as proof against the victim of
the search. Such exclusionary prohibition extends to the indirect products of the initial
unlawful police conduct

State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 239 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)).
In Parkinson, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that determining whether
an investigative detention is reasonable requires an inquiry as to whether the officer's
action was justified at its inception and "whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Parkinson, 135
Idaho at 361 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968)). The prohibition against
8

unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent a search that is "not limited to the
particularly described 'place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized[.]"'

Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 499-500). The United States Supreme Court
unequivocally has asserted that, "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a
temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop."

Royer, 460 U.S. at 498 (emphasis added). It is well established that an investigative
detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop," and a citizen "may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651-52
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 500). Furthermore, although the stop of
the vehicle may be of short duration, if the continued detention of the driver
unreasonably extends beyond the length necessary for the purpose of the stop, the
continued detention of the driver without any reasonable suspicion to support such
inquiry is violative of the Fourth Amendment. Gutierrez, at 652 (citing United States v.

Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519-20 (10 th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10 th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Valdez, 267 F.3d 395, 398 (5 th Cir. 2001 )).
However, it is recognized that the purpose of the stop is not always "fixed" at
the time the stop is first initiated, as a routine traffic stop could turn up suspicious
conditions that "could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop.

The

officer's observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may -- and
often do -- give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further
investigation by an officer."

Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362 (citing State v. Myers, 118

Idaho 608, 613 (Ct. App. 1990)).
9

Here, Mr. Thies does not contend that Officer Vogt did not have reasonable
suspicion to temporarily detain him to investigate the alleged domestic violence situation
and the malicious injury to property allegation, but that Officer Vogt improperly extended
the detention after investigation of the alleged criminal activities should have been
completed and by taking approximately 15 minutes to fill out a simple driving without
privileges citation.

According to the Officer Price's audio recording, Officer Vogt

apparently located Mr. Thies and his vehicle about 2 minutes into the recording.
(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 1:56.)

Officer Lindley did not arrive with the drug

canine until about 25 minutes after Officer Vogt's initial contact with Mr. Thies. (Prelim.,
p.24, Ls.9-20.) Officer Vogt testified that he requested the canine unit after learning that
Mr. Thies' license was suspended and after Mr. Thies refused to allow Officer Vogt to
search his vehicle.

(3/9/11 Tr., p.87, L.17 - p.89, L.23, p.93, Ls.6-22.) According to

Officer Price's audio recording, Officer Vogt requested the canine approximately 12
minutes after his initial contact with Mr. Thies, then immediately began working on the
citation.

(Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio at 14:00; 3/9/11 Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.5.)

Thus, it took Officer Vogt over 13 minutes to complete a simple driving without
privileges citation that he admitted he could probably complete in four to five minutes.
(3/9/11 Tr., p.128, Ls.4-8.) Moreover, Officer Vogt admitted that he knew he did not
have probable cause to search the vehicle but "was interested to see what was inside of
[the car]." (3/9/11 Tr., p.123, L.17 - p.124, L.B.) Thus, it is readily apparent that Officer
Vogt, after Mr. Thies refused to consent to a search of his vehicle, was intent upon
waiting for a canine unit based upon his hunch the vehicle contained contraband even
though Officer Vogt admitted that he did not include in his report that Mr. Thies smelled
of marijuana on his person or had a green tongue. (3/9/11 Tr., p.136, L.25 - p.137,
10

L.7.)

Accordingly, Officer Vogt unreasonably delayed his detention of Mr. Thies by

taking approximately 13 minutes to fill out a simple citation.
Additionally, based upon the record before this Court, the district court's finding
that the officers' investigation of Mr. Thies for domestic violence and Ms. Price for
malicious injury to property was not yet completed by the time the canine alerted on the
vehicle was clearly erroneous.

See State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485 (2007); State v.

Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374 (Ct. App. 2009). Officer Vogt testified that very soon after

arriving on the scene, he Mirandized Mr. Thies and learned from Mr. Thies that the
disagreement with Ms. Price had only been verbal, not physical. (3/9/11 Tr., p.85, L.18 p.86, L.3; Exhibit 3 Officer Vogt Audio.) Officer Vogt also acknowledged that he did not
observe any marks or physical injuries upon Ms. Price.

(3/9/11 Tr., p.120, Ls.7-13.)

Moreover, very soon after Officer Price's arrival on the scene he learned from Ms. Price
that the argument between Mr. Thies and Ms. Price had not been physical. (Exhibit 3
Officer Price Audio.)

Finally, Officer Vogt testified that collectively, the officers had

learned that there was no physical altercation in the vehicle. (3/9/11 Tr., p.119, Ls.1317.)

Thus, early in the investigation, any concerns of a domestic violence incident

having previously occurred had been dispelled.
Furthermore, just as the officer's concerns regarding the domestic incident had
been dispelled early on, the investigation of a potential malicious injury to property
allegation was concluded at the time, or shortly after, Ms. Price told Officer Price that
she did in fact throw items out the window of the vehicle, which struck Mr. Biehl's
vehicle, causing minimal damage. (Exhibit 3, Officer Price Audio.) Accordingly, the 25
minute detention of Mr. Thies was unreasonable and was clearly for the purpose of
waiting for a drug dog to arrive on the scene to satisfy Officer Vogt's curiosity as he
11

"was interested to see what was inside of [the car]." (3/9/11 Tr., p.123, L.17 - p.124,
L.8.)

Accordingly, because Mr. Thies was detained "even momentarily" longer than
necessary to effectuate the stop, his rights under the United States Constitution were
violated. Mr. Thies asserts that the discovery of the evidence used against him was the
product of his illegal detention and should have been suppressed as "fruit of the
poisonous tree."

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963).

Therefore, Mr. Thies asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Thies respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order

denying his suppression motion and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 25 th day of April, 2012.

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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